It would cost $30 to $40 million to demolish the old Highmark Stadium, while a USL expansion fee is only $20 million, and soccer-specific retrofits would cost less than $15 million.
By Staff Reporter | November 8, 2025
ORCHARD PARK, N.Y.—As the Buffalo Bills gear up for their relocation to a gleaming $2.1 billion stadium adjacent to the current Highmark Stadium next summer, owner Terry Pegula is quietly exploring a bold alternative to the site’s planned demolition: converting the 52-year-old venue into a hub for professional soccer.
The proposal, in preliminary discussions according to people familiar with the deliberations, could dovetail with a local push to bring a United Soccer League (USL) franchise to Buffalo, capitalizing on the league’s aggressive expansion and relatively accessible economics compared to Major League Soccer (MLS).
Highmark Stadium, owned by Erie County and leased to the Bills, faces the wrecking ball starting early 2026 at an estimated $30 million cost—funded as a part of the full $2.1 billion construction price tag paid for through a blend of state grants, Pegula’s contributions, and proceeds from personal seat licenses (PSLs) for the new facility.
Redirecting resources toward adaptive reuse could slash expenses to $15 million to $20 million for soccer-specific retrofits, such as reconfiguring seating for optimal field dimensions. The stadium’s field dimensions—120 yards long by 53.3 yards wide—align closely with USL standards (typically 115 yards by 74 yards), limiting structural modifications to the first few rows of seating, while preserving a 71,608-seat capacity.
While typical USL games would be more likely to draw 5,000 to 10,000 for matches, the extra capacity could allow the venue to serve as an event center for concerts and music festivals, or even home to an MLS franchise in the future.
For Pegula, whose sports empire spans hockey, football, and lacrosse with a collective valuation exceeding $7 billion, this move would mark an entry into untested waters. Yet the timing aligns with soccer’s surging U.S. trajectory, where the USL’s lower barriers to entry—$20 million franchise fees versus MLS’s $500 million—offer a pathway to quicker returns.
“Pegula has a proven knack for turning regional assets into economic engines,” said a sports investment analyst who spoke on condition of anonymity. “USL expansions are breaking even in two to four years; this could be his low-risk bet on the beautiful game’s next chapter in America.”

Pegula’s Empire and the Emerging Soccer Thread
Terry Pegula, 74, has poured over $3 billion into Western New York’s sports infrastructure since cashing out his natural gas firm, East Resources, for $4.7 billion in 2010. His crown jewels include the NFL‘s Bills, acquired for $1.4 billion in 2014 and now valued at $5.87 billion—a 320% return fueled by league-wide media windfalls—and the NHL‘s Buffalo Sabres, purchased for $189 million in 2011 and worth $1.36 billion today. Complementary holdings like the three-time champion Buffalo Bandits (National Lacrosse League) and the Rochester Americans (American Hockey League) underscore his strategy of ecosystem-building, including the $250 million Harborcenter mixed-use complex in downtown Buffalo.
Soccer has been conspicuously absent from this portfolio—until recently. In late 2024, Pegula brought aboard former U.S. Men’s National Team striker Jozy Altidore as a minority investor in the Bills, part of a landmark 20.6% stake sale that included private equity from Arctos Partners and a consortium featuring NBA Hall of Famer Tracy McGrady and others. The deal, the NFL’s first major private equity infusion, injected not just capital but soccer savvy: Altidore, a co-founder of the Black Players’ Collective advocating for diversity in MLS, has informally pitched Pegula on the sport’s untapped potential in Buffalo.
The city, with its 1.1 million metro population and proximity to Toronto’s 6 million-strong market, boasts a vibrant grassroots soccer scene. Amateur outfits like FC Buffalo routinely draw 2,000 fans to U.S. Open Cup clashes. This energy has fueled Buffalo Pro Soccer, an ownership group helmed by developer Peter Marlette Jr., which inked a USL Championship partnership in March 2024. The plan called for a privately funded $10 million, 7,600-seat stadium on the East Side, backed by investors including Bills long snapper Reid Ferguson and renewable-energy executive Jon M. Williams. But environmental hurdles and site delays in July scuttled the timeline, postponing a debut to 2027.
Repurposing Highmark could revive that momentum overnight.
“We’ve got 10,000 petition signatures and projections for $20 million in annual economic ripple effects—jobs, tourism, youth programs,” Marlette said in an interview.
With Pegula’s infrastructure and expertise already in place in Western New York, this becomes a turnkey operation, not a ground-up gamble.

The Economic Calculus: USL vs. MLS Pathways
At its core, the proposal hinges on soccer’s tiered economics, where the USL offers a nimbler on-ramp than MLS. The USL Championship, Division II’s flagship with 24 teams in 2025 and plans for 30-plus by 2027, commands a $20 million expansion fee—up from $10 million in 2019 but a fraction of MLS’s $500 million benchmark, as paid by San Diego FC for its 2025 entry.
Total startup for a USL team runs $30 million to $100 million, including stadium work, with annual operating costs of $3 million to $5 million offset by revenues of $5 million to $15 million from tickets (40% share), sponsorships (30%), and modest broadcasting revenues.
Return on investment timelines underscore the appeal: USL expansions like Sacramento Republic FC (2014) achieved break-even by Year 2 and now generate $50 million annually, while Phoenix Rising FC (2017) turned profitable in Year 3 before asset sales doubled its value.
League-wide, 60% of clubs are now EBITDA-positive, up from just one in 2019, with full ROI (team value doubling to $40 million–$60 million) in three to six years. For Buffalo, a Highmark retrofit could compress this further, leveraging existing parking and concessions to hit $10 million in Year 1 revenue at 4,000–6,000 average attendance.
Contrast this with MLS, where the league’s $20 billion valuation and 30-team footprint (paused until post-2026 World Cup) demand $700 million to $1.2 billion upfront, including soccer-specific stadiums averaging $350 million.
Operating costs soar to $80 million–$150 million annually, with revenues averaging $110 million but requiring 5–10 years for full ROI. Newcomers like LAFC (2018) broke even in two years thanks to $150 million in early revenue, but St. Louis City SC (2023) needed three for profitability amid $1 billion total outlay. Expansions face initial $20 million–$50 million losses, though central media distributions ($90 million minimum per team via the Apple broadcasting deal) and transfer fees ($336 million league record in 2025) accelerate recovery.
Pegula’s calculus likely favors USL’s model: a $20 million fee plus $15 million retrofit yields a $35 million entry (which he would otherwise pay to demolish the old stadium).
Typically, break-even will happen in 2–4 years for USL franchises, versus MLS’s decade-long horizon. Player salaries add nuance—USL’s $300,000 floor supports lean rosters, while MLS’s $89,716 minimum escalates to $15 million–$40 million payrolls, buoyed by designated players like Lionel Messi ($20.4 million at Inter Miami).
“USL is the smart diversification for an owner like Pegula—feed the MLS pipeline while owning the upside in a mid-market gem,” the analyst noted.

Hurdles, Opportunities, and Broader Implications
Not all stakeholders are sold. Erie County Executive Mark Poloncarz, overseeing the demolition’s $30 million pot, prioritizes the site’s conversion to 10,000 parking spaces for Bills tailgaters, noting that zoning for year-round soccer events could spark Orchard Park backlash over traffic and noise.
Pegula’s track record tempers skepticism. Despite the Sabres’ 14-year playoff drought, his $100 million gift birthed Penn State‘s Division I hockey program, and the Harborcenter has become a downtown anchor. Critics, including online forums decrying his “hockey hex,” question another sports revival, but Altidore’s involvement—texting optimism about “Buffalo’s heart meeting soccer’s global pulse”—signals buy-in.
Sources close to Pegula describe internal modeling of scenarios, with a decision eyed by year-end as demolition bids close this month.
Beyond Buffalo, the play could ripple. USL’s 2025 slate includes 10-plus new teams, like Rhode Island FC and AV Alta FC, generating $100 million in cumulative fees since 2018 and projecting $1.8 billion market value by 2030.
Pegula’s entry might inspire NFL peers—think Arthur Blank‘s MLS success with Atlanta United—to eye USL as a proving ground, especially with women’s growth via the USL Super League ($10 million fees, $13.7 million–$18.8 million startups). For a region synonymous with resilience, Highmark’s rebirth could symbolize reinvention: from gridiron relic to soccer vanguard, blending Pegula’s “One Buffalo” ethos with America’s kicking fixation.
If pursued, this wouldn’t just salvage concrete— it could vault Buffalo into soccer’s second division spotlight, one strategic retrofit at a time. As Pegula weighs the blueprints, the clock ticks toward 2026, when the beautiful game might just find a permanent home in the Queen City.

ROI Timelines for MLS and USL Expansions
Return on Investment (ROI) timelines for sports league expansions vary based on factors like market size, stadium infrastructure, ownership depth, and revenue streams (e.g., media rights, sponsorships, and attendance). For Major League Soccer (MLS) and the United Soccer League (USL) Championship, expansions involve high upfront costs but benefit from soccer’s growing U.S. popularity, amplified by the 2026 FIFA World Cup.
MLS expansions typically require deeper pockets and longer ramps due to $500 million+ fees and $700 million–$1.2 billion total investments, while USL’s lower barriers ($20 million fees) enable quicker paths to profitability.
Break-even (covering operating costs) often precedes full ROI (positive equity value growth). Data draws from league reports, Forbes valuations, and industry analyses as of November 2025. Recent expansions like San Diego FC (MLS, 2025 debut) project faster timelines due to enhanced media deals ($2.5 billion Apple pact through 2032). Below is a comparative breakdown.
ROI Timeline Comparison
League/Division |
Typical Break-Even Timeline |
Full ROI Timeline (Value Doubling+) |
Key Examples |
Influencing Factors |
|---|---|---|---|---|
MLS (Division I) |
3–5 years (operating profitability) |
5–10 years (team value growth to 2x investment) |
– LAFC (2018): Break-even by Year 2 ($150M revenue by 2020); 4x value ($1.25B by 2025). – St. Louis City SC (2023): Profitable by Year 3 ($100M+ impact); on track for 6-year ROI. – San Diego FC (2025): Projected break-even Year 3 via 20,000+ attendance. |
High media/sponsorship revenue (40% of income); star signings accelerate (e.g., Messi’s Inter Miami: 2-year surge). Delays from stadium builds (e.g., Austin FC: 4 years). 45% of teams profitable league-wide in 2025. |
USL Championship (Division II) |
2–4 years (EBITDA positive) |
3–6 years (team value to $40–60M) |
– Sacramento Republic (2014): Break-even Year 2; $50M+ annual revenue by 2025. – Phoenix Rising (2017): Profitable Year 3; sold assets at 2x value in 2024. – Rhode Island FC (2025): Targeting Year 2 via $535M development tie-ins. |
Lower ops costs ($3–5M/year); local sponsorships (30% revenue). 70% of 2025 expansions break even by Year 3; pro/rel pilots (2025+) boost liquidity. In 2019, only 1 club profitable—now 60%+. |
Expansions like Orlando City (2015) took 7 years for full ROI amid $240M stadium costs, but post-2020 teams (e.g., Austin FC) average 4 years to profitability thanks to $90M+ central media distributions. League-wide, 13/29 teams were operationally profitable mid-2025, with expansions facing initial losses of $20–50M. World Cup uplift could shave 1–2 years off timelines for 2027+ entries (potentially 32 teams).
The economics of USL are more accessible, with 24 teams in 2025 expanding to 30+ by 2027. Recent entrants like Indy Eleven (rebranded 2022) hit break-even in 18 months via 5,000-seat venues. Economic modeling projects $20M annual impact per team, with ROI accelerated by dual men’s/women’s models (e.g., Jacksonville’s 2025 dual launch). Challenges include site delays (e.g., Milwaukee deferred to 2026), but 25 new clubs announced for 2024–2026 signal confidence.
Across both leagues, attendance (MLS: 22,000 avg.; USL: 4,000–6,000) drives 50% of revenue. Early MLS teams (e.g., Chicago Fire, 1998) saw 10x ROI over 25 years.
These timelines assume stable economies; for city-specific projections (e.g., Buffalo USL bid), factors like Pegula’s involvement could compress USL paths to 2–3 years.

MLS Expansion Economics in 2025
Major League Soccer (MLS), the top-tier professional men’s soccer league in North America, has solidified its status as a $20+ billion industry by 2025, with 30 teams following San Diego FC’s debut season.
Expansion economics reflect the league’s maturation: sky-high entry barriers that fund infrastructure, coupled with robust revenue growth from media deals (e.g., Apple TV‘s $2.5 billion pact through 2032), sponsorships, and the 2026 FIFA World Cup boost.
The average team is valued at $721 million (up 6% from 2024), with total league revenue exceeding $3 billion annually. However, expansion is paused post-30 teams, per Commissioner Don Garber‘s 2024 statements—no new applications accepted until after 2026.
Unlike the more accessible USL ($20 million fees), MLS prioritizes stability and single-entity structure, where the league owns player contracts and shares central revenues. Typically, new franchises require stadium commitments, deep-pocketed ownership, and market sizes average a metro population of 4.3 million.
Successful expansions like St. Louis City SC (2023) generate $100 million+ in year-one economic impact, but ROI takes 5-10 years amid high upfront costs. Below is a breakdown based on 2025 data from MLS Players Association (MLSPA) guides, Forbes, Sportico, and league disclosures.
Metric |
Value (2025) |
Notes/Examples |
|---|---|---|
Franchise/Expansion Fee |
$500 million |
Record fee for San Diego FC (2025 debut), paid by Egyptian billionaire Mohamed Mansour’s group; up from $325 million for Charlotte FC (2022) and $200 million for Austin FC (2019). Fees fund league-wide initiatives like youth academies and media rights. No new expansions planned; next wave (potentially 32 teams) eyed post-2026 World Cup. |
Total Startup Investment |
$700 million–$1.2 billion+ |
Includes $500 million fee + stadium ($200-600 million, e.g., San Diego’s Snapdragon Stadium retrofit at ~$250 million) + operations/working capital ($50-100 million). St. Louis’ total hit $1 billion (2023); Indianapolis bids estimated $800 million. Public-private partnerships cover 20-40% of stadiums via bonds/tax incentives. |
Annual Operating Costs |
$80–$150 million |
Varies by market; includes payroll (~20%), stadium maintenance (~15%), marketing (~10%), and travel (~5%). LAFC’s 2024 costs implied at $138 million (revenue $150 million minus $12 million income). League-wide, only 13 of 29 teams were profitable at operating income level in mid-2025; expansions add $10-20 million in year-one ramp-up. |
Player Salaries (Floor/Range) |
League minimum: $89,716 (senior roster); Average: $354,000–$594,000; Total payroll per team: $15–$40 million |
MLSPA 2025 guide shows 832 players with $300 million+ league wage bill. Top earners: Lionel Messi ($20.4 million, Inter Miami), Heung-min Son ($11.15 million, LAFC). Salary cap: $5.21 million/team (budget charge); Designated Players (3 max) exceed via allocation money (up to $2.765 million extra for expansions like San Diego). 19 players earn $4 million+; median ~$250,000. |
Projected Annual Revenues |
$80–$180 million (average ~$110 million) |
Breakdown: Tickets/merch (40%), sponsorships (30%), media (20%), transfers (10%). Inter Miami leads at $180 million (Messi effect); LAFC $150 million; league average up 15% YoY to $3.3 billion total. Expansions like San Diego project $100 million by year three, fueled by 20,000+ attendance and Apple deal distributions ($90 million/team minimum). |
- Fee Escalation and Revenue Sharing: Fees have ballooned 2,500% since 2005 ($20 million era), reflecting valuations (e.g., LAFC $1.25 billion, top-ranked). 50% of fees redistribute to existing owners; the rest bolsters central funds. Single-entity model caps risks but limits autonomy—teams get ~30% of local revenues back.
- Stadium Imperative: Soccer-specific venues are mandatory; 70% of expansions involve new builds (e.g., Austin’s $240 million Q2 Stadium). Costs average $350 million, with 25% public funding (e.g., bonds in Nashville). Shared NFL/MLB stadiums (e.g., San Diego) cut expenses but limit branding.
- Revenue Streams: Media (Apple/ESPN) provides stability ($2.5 billion/10 years); sponsorships hit $500 million league-wide (Adidas, Heineken). Transfers shattered records at $336 million in 2025 (up 79% YoY), with sales like Alphonso Davies boosting exits. Attendance averages 22,000/game; Messi-era spikes (Inter Miami: 65,000 average) show star power’s ROI.
- Challenges and ROI: High barriers exclude mid-markets (e.g., Sacramento pivoted to USL); 40% of teams unprofitable due to debt service. Expansions face 2-3 year losses ($20-50 million) before breakeven. Positive: 45% profitability rate (up from 30% in 2023); average value-to-revenue multiple of 9.4x (second-highest after NBA). World Cup 2026 could add $500 million in uplift.
- 2025 Highlights: San Diego’s launch validates model—$500 million fee, $2.765 million extra GAM for roster building. No pro/rel (despite ESPN speculation), but GAM/transfer tweaks aid parity. Women’s NWSL (MLS affiliate) fees at $53 million signal ecosystem growth.
MLS’s economics reward patience: Early teams (e.g., LA Galaxy, $1 billion value) have 10x’d investments, but newcomers need $1 billion+ commitment.
Franchise bids post-2026 could reopen at $600-700 million fees.

Be the first to comment